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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE BASIS oF RELIEF FROM PENALTIES AND FoR EITURES.-The equitable
principle of relief from penalties and forfeitures is so far elementary as
almost to defy analysis. Many, perhaps most, of the judicial explanations
of the principle have based it upon interpretation or construction, appealing
to the doctrine that equity regards intent rather than form. Yet a logical
application of this doctrine would lead to results very different from those
which have actually been arrived at in the decisions. Thus, a stipulation in
a mortgage that the mortgagor waives his equity of redemption can hardly
be interpreted as meaning that he does not waive it, yet all such stipulations
are ignored and redemption granted, nevertheless. Again, a penalty for
breach of contract cannot be saved by the most solemn declaration that it
is intended as liquidated damages. It must be conceded that many cases
have actually been, decided on the interpretation theory, producing such enormities as Iowa Land Co. v. Mickel, 41 Ia. 4o2 (sale of land, $15a out of $6oo
paid, $4ooo in improvements, second instalment of" $150 one day late due to
a misunderstanding; held forfeited), and Doctornan v. Schroeder, 114 AUt.
8io (N. J., 1921; sale of land, $IOOO paid, last instalment of $iooo thirty
minutes late; held forfeited). But such cases represent the minority view,
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and one applicable only to instalment sales, no court pursuing this course
in mortgage or liquidated damage cases.
In truth, relief from penalties and forfeitures involves a nullification of
the intent of the parties, a refusal to give legal effect to their solemn agreements, and constitutes a glaring exception (not, of course, the only one)
to the general rule that parties of full capacity are hound by their agreements. And this exception must be referred to "conscience," the principle
of natural justice upon which equity has relieved from a great variety of
unconscionable transactions, and with which, more recently, the common law
has fallen in love.
But we have only cleared the ground when we have referred the problem
to the head of conscience, for conscience embraces a multitude of principles.
Can we identify more precisely the principles governing relief from forfeiture?
Analyzing the Chancellor's conscience may be unscrewing the inscrutable,
but let us press on.
It has been. suggested by high authority that equitable interference in
the mortgage case is based upon duress of circumstances. "Necessitous
men are not free men." Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden Io.
"Debtors, under
the force of pressing necessities, will submit to almost any exactions."
Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116, 126.
But this will not explain relief from the stipulation for forfeiture in a
land contract, nor relief of the lessee from forfeiture for non-payment of
rent, nor relief from penalty for breach of an ordinary contract. Cases of
this sort may indeed occur in which the party submitting himself to forfeiture does so because of pressing necessity, just as cases may occur in
which a mortgagor is not under such pressure, but this element may be
considered normal in the mortgage cases and abnormal in the others. What
is typical of" these last is an element of misreliance. It is not mistake of
present fact, and therefore not mistake in the technical legal sense. It is
mistake or error as to future developments. Yet it is a mistake which all
mankind is prone to make, that of overconfidence in one's own capacities
and faith in a special providence. Hope springs eternal. For this all thanks,
but it leads us to over-sanguine commitments. This being human nature,
the courts cannot but take account of it and relieve from its consequences,
so far as this can be done without undue invasion of other interests. That
this is the basic principle in these cases seems to be borne out by the fact
that the judicial attitude toward an agreement for "liquidated damages" is
so different from that toward an accord. An agreement to pay "liquidated
damages" for a future breach of contract will not be enforced unless it
bears a reasonable relation to actual damage. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§
777-779. But an accord after breach can only be impeached for duress or
fraud or mistake (in the ordinary sense of those terms), and even mistake
will be unavailing if the accord involves a settlement of a dispute upon the
very matter which is mistaken. lb., §§ 780, 1543. Again, a surrender by a
defaulting lessee or purchaser is on a very different footing from forfeiture
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by proviso in the lease or contract. Do not these distinctions turn upon the
presence or absence of misreliance upon airy hope?
And the element of misreliance is present in the typical mortgage case.
That it has been a vital element is borne out by the state of the cases. Stipulations providing for future forfeiture of the equity of redemption, if the
debt is not paid at a certain day, are held absolutely void. But when the
mortgagor by present conveyance releases his equity of redemption to the
mortgagee, the transaction is not necessarily void, the most liberal doctrine
being that it will be scrutinized in much the same way as transactions between
trustee and cestui que trust, to see that no undue advantage is taken of the
necessities of the mortgagor. Yet the mortgagor is, presumably, at least
as necessitous in the latter case as in the former. It has been said that the
distinction is between stipulations contemporaneous with the mortgage and
those subsequent to it. 21 HARav. L. Riv. 466. But in the few cases involving subsequent agreements for future forfeiture, the transaction has, by all
but unanimous authority, been held absolutely void. Batty v. Snook, 5 Mich.
231; Holden Co. v. Interstate Co., 87 Kas. 221; Cohn v. Bridgeport Co., 115
Atl. 328 (Conn., 1921). Contra, Bradbury v. Davenport, 120 Cal. 152. It
would seem that the distinctions among the mortgage cases turn upon the
presence or absence of the mirage of hope.
Yet it can hardly be said that the other element, duress of circumstances,
is not material in the mortgage cases. There is nothing else to support the
"scrutiny" of the release (by present conveyance) of the equity of redemption. Furthermore, the fixed rule of mortgage law by virtue of which all
executory stipulations waiving the equity of redemption are void, regardless
of the equities of the particular case, stands in marked contrast to the doctrines of the other cases under discussion, which (characteristic in this respect
of equity at large) are flexible and take account of the particular circumstances. Would it not seem that this might be explained by the fact that in
the former the elements of duress and misreliance combine, while in the
latter only one of these elements appears? Justice Field said of the former
rule: "Its maintenance is deemed essential to the protection of the debtor,
who, under pressing ,ecessities, will often submit to ruinous conditions,
expecting or hoping to be able to repay the loan at its maturity." Peugh v.
Davis, 96 U. S. 332. (Italics ours.)
Of course, the rigid rule of mortgage law serves the social interest in
legal certainty, but this interest would be likewise served by a like rigid
rule in the other cases. This interest being substantially constant throughout,
and the results being diverse, it would seem that this social interest has not
controlled. Eliminating that, there is left, on the one side, the "equity" of
duress or misreliance (or both in combination), and on the other side and
opposed to them, the social and individual interests in freedom of contract
and security of transactions, plus (especially in the liquidated damage cases)
a social ifiterest in settlement by private agreement of questions which would
otherwise present a judicial problem of considerable difficulty. And in this
struggle of conflicting interests it would seem that, when duress of circum-
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stance and mistaken self-confidence combine they have won complete recognition in a rigid rule of nullification, while either of these elements standing
alone has won but partial recognition, in the rule of particular equities.
It must be conceded that the problems herein discussed are somewhat
more complex than this analysis would indicate. There are elements in
them other than those discussed. See the article on "Penalties and Forfeitures," by William H. Lloyd, in 29 HARV. L. Rzv. 117. And there are
certain features of the law which seem not to fit into the scheme at all. For
example, the transactions which, upon lines of distinction none too well
settled (see the little note of some six hundred pages in L. R. A. 1916 B,
18 ff.), are held to be conditional sales rather than equitable mortgages,
these always involve the fool's paradise, and very often involve duress of
circumstance, yet the letter of the agreement is enforced. And we only
partially remove the inconsistency when we say that substantially all the
hard cases are taken care of by throwing them, on one ground or another,
into the mortgage category. All these difficulties are admitted, yet it is
hoped that the foregoing analysis throws a little light into a dark corner.
E. N. D.
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